The biggest mistake an observer of the Egyptian scene today could make is to accept the popular theory that the country is suffering from an array of “terminal” diseases that are eating away at the very fabric of society. Of course, a perfunctory look would tend to support this fundamentally flawed theory, with countless examples that appear to validate it. Blatant violations of laws and regulations are rife, aggressive behavior is the norm, the collapse of principles and values is clear—the syndromes of a society in crisis are too numerous to cite. Add to that the problems of day-to-day living faced by the average citizen—chaotic traffic, deplorable public transport, pock-marked streets that are often awash with sewage, repeated power failures, taps running dry, as well as a plethora of severe housing problems—and the situation looks terminal indeed. Sometimes it does seem that anyone dealing with Egypt comes across a new ailment daily, be it in the government, the judicial system, or local life in general. But for all that, the theory would not stand up to careful analysis. Instead these are symptoms of a limited number of diseases—and symptoms can be kept in check. The situation could be compared to a cardiac patient suf­fering from many aches and pains. If the patient believes (or imagines) he is suffering from more than one disease, rather than different symptoms of the same one, he will waste time, money and energy trying to pinpoint each one. Treating the symptoms separately will not help cure the original disease, which produced all the symptoms in the first place. The same is true of the many problems which plague Egypt today. If we examine the basic functions of the state towards its citizens, we will have taken an important step in the direction of achieving our main objective, which is, first, to identify the diseases inherent in contemporary Egyptian reality and their symptoms, and, second, to treat the most debilitating of them. The history of political thought provides us with a clear model to use as a starting point: the state is a political organization whose traditional basic functions are: 1) defense; 2) security; 3) justice; 4) public services. Members of any given society expect the state, as a political organization, to assume on their behalf the responsibility of defense in case of external aggression. This entails the presence of an army capable of warding off threats and dangers from outside to protect the in­dividuals living within the state’s borders. The society also expects the state to guarantee the security of its members, which requires the existence of a ministry or mechanism whose job is to protect citizens from internal aggression and criminal activity, collective or otherwise, as well as to provide other aspects of security such as road safety, safe housing, etc. At the same time the state is responsible for the maintenance and administration of justice in its broadest sense by promulgating and guaranteeing the application of laws. Finally, the state must provide citizens with certain basic services, such as electricity, water, road infrastructure, sewers, means of transport and communication. These are the four traditional basic functions of the state, according to lines of political thinking and constitutional jurisprudence. It is worth noting here that socialist philosophy considers the state responsible for many other functions as well. If we look at the record of the Egyptian state when it comes to performing its basic obligations towards the people, what do we see? Over the last three decades, the state has, while paying lip service to the maxim, "in the service of society and the citizens," set itself other aims and functions to which it accorded a higher priority than the four basic functions incumbent on it. Between 1952-70 Egypt’s main aims were to extend its influence in Africa, the Middle East, the Arab world and the non-aligned movement, in addition to defending the regime inside, ensuring its continuity and striking its opponents locally and abroad. Under President Sadat, the highest priority—at least during the first five years of his rule—was to liberate the Egyptian territories occupied as a result of an unforgivable mistake made in the Nasser era. The following six years witnessed unscientific, unmethodical and often haphazard attempts by the state to perform some of its traditional basic functions. The present regime, led by President Mubarak, has been characterized by an apparent intention to perform its basic functions towards Egyptian society, deploying the whole state apparatus to this end if need be. In terms of practical application, there have been many positive steps in the services sector, such as the energetic efforts to build new bridges and houses, prod the sagging centers of national industry into increasing productivity and enhanced per­formance, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and to upgrade public utilities, notably electricity and sewage networks, many of which have not been in any way renovated since they were built by Khedive Isma’il,65 over a century ago. Yet these laudable efforts are offset by other, contradictory, measures which all too often cancel out many of their positive results. A global political and economic vision can easily detect the two causes of this incongruity: the first is an incapacity to differentiate between the disease and the symptom, the second is a lack of consensus within the governing apparatus as to what the state's basic functions really are. We believe the most important task of the government, headed by the institution of the presidency, is to diagnose the fundamental diseases undermining political, economic and social life, as distinct from the myriad symptoms they display. In fact, Egypt inherited from the near and distant past only a handful of basic political and social diseases, but it is these that are causing all the pains and problems today. At the political level, the primary disease is the lack of true democracy. At the economic level, we are suffering from the disease of a command economy, whose main symptom is a flaccid public sector which is allowed by the state to exercise hegemony over industry, production and agriculture. There can be no tangible improvement in Egypt's economic problems unless the private sector is given a free hand, unless individual initiative is unleashed and unless the state refrains from its unsuccessful interference in the areas of industry and production. Like all other states which have experimented with centralized economic organization, Egypt's performance in industry and production has been consistently poor. Those who call for reducing imports and promoting products "Made in Egypt" should know that, though sound from the nationalistic point of view, these measures can only be realized by the Egyptian private sector and individual initiative. The Egyptian public sector has been given more than one chance, yet it has failed abysmally. Thanks to its primary role in the country's economic life, the economy is in shambles. Moreover, the public sector has created a destructive climate for production as well as a hapless breed of workers and managers. Those who still support the Egyptian public sector must be aware that if it were to be auctioned off and the proceeds placed in a bank, the returns for Egypt would be much higher than those it derives today from this sector, which has produced the worst models of labor and management. If the Egyptian governing apparatus, more particularly the cabinet, does not tackle the many problems of our present political, economic and social life in full awareness that they are only symptoms of two diseases—lack of democracy and the continued reliance on a command economy—its efforts to improve the lot of Egyptians, however sincere, are doomed to failure. Moreover, a decision by the government to continue in its present patriarchal role as mover and master of all economic life in the country can only make the present problems worse and, inevitably, lead to a further deterioration in living standards. This will in turn create an atmosphere of alienation, unrest and despair favorable to the spread of leftist ideas, even of a communist movement which could eventually seize power. While recognizing that the present regime is genuinely willing to deal with our many political and economic problems, and that systematic efforts are being made to redress what the last 30 years have destroyed, it seems nonetheless that the cabinet continues to grapple with the symptoms, and not the diseases. Fear of public opinion is the main reason for this. To be fair, a notable exception to its sidestepping was the decision to dismiss the scandal-ridden minister of economy (and former foreign affairs minister), Dr. Mustafa al-Said, in 1985. But this should have happened sooner: local and foreign investors—and all of Egypt—are still reeling from the adverse effects of his ill-advised policies. Let us try, for a moment, to apportion      responsibility for the present situation. One might ask: -       Is the government alone to blame for today's tragic political, economic and social situation in Egypt? Or should the finger be pointed at both the government and the citizens? Or possibly just the citizens? -      To what extent are the successive governments’ errors over the years accountable for the situation, and should individuals also share the blame? -      Should the government alone look for a solution? Or should this task be left to individual Egyptian citizens? Or, should it be the joint responsibility of both? Such questions—actually one question asked from several perspectives—stand at the very core of an analysis of this issue. Let us examine a slice of the tissue of daily life in Egypt today to help us find a valid answer. If we take a large street in any of our big cities, what do we see? A chaotic scene teeming with people, cars and other vehicles, all blatantly violating traffic regulations. One driver, busily chatting with his companion, allows his car to slide backwards, heavily damaging the car behind it; the ensuing heated discussion degenerates into a fistfight interspersed with highly colorful insults. Then, along comes a limousine driven by a boy of no more than seventeen irresponsibly weaving his way through the choked street, flaunting his family's newly acquired wealth. Elsewhere on the street, a traffic policeman stops a similar young man at the wheel of a similar car, requesting to see his license; the young man gets out of his expensive car to berate the policeman standing in his shabby uniform. The latter attempts to defend himself and is rewarded with a resounding slap from the wealthy young man who then climbs back into his car and drives proudly off. On the opposite, slightly less crowded side of the thoroughfare, a bus zooms past its regular stop, barely allowing passengers to board or alight. Among them, a middle-aged man misses the step, falls in the path of the oncoming traffic and is run over by another speeding driver who was unable to brake in time. This scene is played out with monotonous regularity on every street in Cairo today. Who is to blame for the collapse of law and order on the streets of our cities, which have become veritable jungles where only the strong can survive? Is it the citizens, who at first glance seem to be the ones breaking the law and displaying violent patterns of behavior? Or should we set emotions aside and ask why Egyptians are doing this to themselves and to their countrymen? Clearly they are aware that such conduct is disgraceful—they will all tell you so. And foreigners through the ages have been witness to the fact that Egyptians are kind, peaceful and exceptionally courteous to strangers, more so even than many other peoples. What is it then, ignorance? The answer is simple: the government alone is responsible for the chaos with its accompanying aggressiveness, violation of law and order and uncivilized behavior. The citizens, as individuals, do not share the blame and cannot, in all fairness, be expected to find a solution to the crisis. In the streets of more advanced societies, the government's presence is felt right down to the strict traffic regulations enforced by a police force conscious of its duties and not swayed by money or power. Their citizens, too, are constantly aware of the state's presence and power, and its strong arm. Such awareness sinks in over the years to become part of the collective consciousness, so that individuals come to realize that they cannot break the law and disturb public order with impunity. In our streets, on the other hand, the presence of the state is hardly felt and individuals are left largely to their own devices, without a central control or standard criteria of right and wrong. Thus full responsibility for lies with the government for failing to make its presence felt. The lack of efficient representatives of the state capable of enforcing the law and effectively penalizing those who violate it means that individuals are left to behave in accordance with their own set of rules and to their own personal advantage. We know that an individual's behavior is       determined by three fundamental factors:< -  level of education and culture -  level of intelligence and conduct -  upbringing and social background. Those factors obviously vary from one person to another, particularly in societies where public education is quite a recent phenomenon, where the general level of culture is below average and where people are relatively unfamiliar with life in big modern cities. We can thus reasonably claim that the absence of a central control, of standard criteria for traffic rules and of a code of ethics from our streets (because the government is not playing an effective role) is the reason why individuals behave according to their own view of how things should be done. The “Egyptian street,” then, is a projection of the “Egyptian problem,” which is one of government, not of individuals. Some eminent writers claim that Egyptians hold a “magic solution” to all the problems of their present-day life. They are absolutely wrong. They would probably try to counter our theory by saying that the government is but a part of us, that rulers are but members of the group. This apparent truism can in fact be challenged: the only ruler the Egyptians ever really chose was Sa’ad Zaghlul, more than 60 years ago—significantly, at a time when he was in exile, stripped of power, influence and position. All other rulers elected by the Egyptian people were chosen when they were already incumbents, in control of wealth and power, as well as of the media, and tamer legislators. Returning to the issue of the government's role, we find that herein lies the explanation for Egypt's most serious “disease.” The government's top concern for the last 30 years has been how to retain power and ensure its own continuity. It has involved itself in thousands of futile activities which should, rightfully, have been carried out by the private sector, such as producing and selling bread, selling food, controlling agriculture, the press and all areas of trade and industry, while at the same time neglecting the public services which are its raison d'être. Throughout the 1950s-60s our government applied increasing degrees of tyranny and oppression with the laws it promulgated to ensure “loyalty” to the regime. Today, as its tattered mechanism confronts the task of providing fundamental public services, its inefficiency and ineptitude have become clear. Moreover, the people responsible for administering public utilities are completely ignorant of the basic principles of management according to which they should be run. To sum up, then, all of Egypt's problems stem from two main diseases. The first, manifested at the political level, is represented in the total absence of democracy for the 30 years following 1952, and over the last three years in particular, in the emergence of contingent factors which are stunting its revival and growth. The second disease, which affects our economic and social life, is the severe dislocation in the role of the government apparatus. As we have seen, the government involves itself in activities which it does not and never will master, activities which, by their very nature, fall within the purview of private initiative, the private sector and the market laws of supply and demand. At the same time that very same government is shamefully neglecting the areas to which it should be exclusively devoting its capabilities and resources.